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Abstract
The endowment effect is the term used to describe a phenomenon that manifests as a
reluctance to relinquish owned artifacts, even when a viable or better substitute is offered.
It has been confirmed by multiple studies when it comes to ownership of physical artifacts.
If computer users also “own”, and are attached to, their personal security routines, such
feelings could conceivably activate the same endowment effect. This would, in turn, lead to
their over-estimating the “value” of their existing routines, in terms of the protection they
afford, and the risks they mitigate. They might well, as a consequence, not countenance
any efforts to persuade them to adopt a more secure routine, because their comparison
of pre-existing and proposed new routine is skewed by the activation of the endowment
effect.
In this paper, we report on an investigation into the possibility that the endowment
effect activates when people adopt personal password creation routines. We did indeed
find evidence that the endowment effect is likely to be triggered in this context. This
constitutes one explanation for the failure of many security awareness drives to improve
password strength. We conclude by suggesting directions for future research to confirm
our findings, and to investigate the activation of the effect for other security routines.
Keywords: Password Creation Routines; Endowment Effect; Change Willingness; Psycho-
logical Ownership; Scenario-Based Survey
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1 Introduction
Many security awareness and training drives are delivered with the best of intentions, and
appear to be received enthusiastically by the recipients. Yet these same recipients either decline
to change their regular routines, or change their behavior in the short term and then revert
to their original routines [169, 3]. Some trainers attribute this kind of resistance to personal
failings on the part of the recipients [48, 127, 178]. This kind of attribution does not help to
resolve the situation.
Researchers and organizations respond to this situation by endeavoring to improve compli-
ance [14, 151, 177]. Resorting to compliance enhancement efforts and rule-making is under-
standable when organizations are concerned that employee behaviors are placing the organiza-
tion’s information security at risk. Some propose dealing with resistance by imposing penalties
for a failure to implement mandated security measures [87, 135]. Yet these kinds of approaches
can backfire, leading to resentment [17, 153], perhaps because they unacceptably erode the
employee’s autonomy [45].
It would be helpful to understand the underlying causes of behavioral change resistance,
rather than attempting to mandate new behaviors without acknowledging the nature and com-
plexity of the human agent [139, 60]. If we want people to change the way they behave, we
should endeavor to understand exactly why they are rejecting security-related advice. We will
then be in a better position to formulate interventions to minimize the impact of the core
causatives that manifest as reluctance, but are due to a far more complicated interplay of
multiple factors.
Humans have good reasons for their behaviors, even if they perhaps cannot, or will not,
articulate them. Sometimes people are not even conscious of reasons for their own behaviors
[174, 179].
The endowment effect is observed when people feel endowed with a particular artifact, such
that they are reluctant to exchange it for any substitute, even if the substitute is superior [90].
If the endowment effect is active, and people are asked to swap “their” artifact for another,
they are more reluctant than can be expected by chance [96]. This suggests that the recipient of
the artifact considers their endowed artifact to be more desirable than the other artifact, even
if both command the same price in the marketplace. Moreover, this effect can occur almost
immediately the person is endowed with the artifact.
The endowment effect is usually demonstrated by showing that people over-value an en-
dowed artifact. This is evidenced by the fact that they will require more money (WTA: will-
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ingness to accept) to relinquish the endowed item than the actual value of the item i.e. what
someone else would reasonably pay for it (WTP: willingness to pay) [89, 97]. They essentially
over-value the artifact: in their eyes it is more valuable than the objective reality would dictate,
and more valuable than an offered substitute.
There is some evidence that the endowment effect does not only apply to physical artifacts,
nor that it only applies in the lab. It has also been observed being triggered by people feeling
endowed with other “artifacts” such as time and intellectual property [77]. Moreover, when
some effort has been expended in obtaining a particular artifact, this exacerbates the endowment
effect, suggesting that effort, and not merely the object itself, contributes to the triggering of
the endowment effect [119].
We wanted to find out whether people feel endowed with their personal security routines.
In essence, would they be reluctant to exchange them for other routines, and would they over-
value them, in terms of the protection they afford? Clark [38] talks about people “owning”
solutions they have come up with to problems, and certainly finding a personal way of dealing
with passwords can be thought of as a solution. Does such ownership trigger the endowment
effect in the password creation context?
The endowment effect, if it is indeed activated by effort invested in coming up with routines
in the information security context, probably works in concert with other factors leading to
change resistance. Osman et al. [126] point out that successful behavioral change campaigns
require a suite of interventions to be devised and deployed. They also explain that it is often
challenging to predict which combination of methods will be most efficacious. A better un-
derstanding of people’s rejection of security advice, and perceptions of risk, is the first step
towards determining exactly which interventions are best to deploy. Here, we chose to focus on
the potential influence of the endowment effect, which Arlen and Tontrup [10] consider to be a
behavioral bias that can indeed be deactivated.
If we can confirm that this effect activates when it comes to security routines, proven tech-
niques from other disciplines, where the efficacy of “muting” interventions have been confirmed
[10], can be deployed to minimize its impact.
The one place where computer users encounter security risk is during authentication. The
password, despite many reports predicting its imminent demise, still permeates our online
lives [63]. One of the most ubiquitous pieces of advice given to computer users is to choose
strong passwords that reduce the risk of not only data theft and damaged reputation, but also
financial risks from ransomware attacks, loss of trust, and potential liability for damages from
inadvertent hosting of Distributed Denial of Service attacks [53, 129, 172, 184]. Nonetheless,
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the use of weak passwords is still prevalent [74]. We therefore chose password creation routines
as the subject of our investigation. We describe a study we undertook to explore the existence
and potential impact of the endowment effect in the password creation context. We report on
our findings and conclude by suggesting directions for future research.
2 Reluctance to Switch
Cyber security is a relatively new phenomenon on an evolutionary scale, certainly much newer
than many other areas of human risk management, such as managing physical safety or disease
prevention. Due to its newness, it is thus reasonable to assume that the populace at large lacks
sufficient knowledge and skills to secure their own information, systems and devices adequately
[62, 138, 141, 143].
One risk mitigation technique is to enforce strength by disallowing weak passwords [154].
While this is an effective strategy, it does require installation on each and every system. The
usual approach grants people the autonomy to choose a password themselves, having ensured
that they know how choose to strong passwords. This strategy requires deliberate knowledge
deficit-reduction efforts to be made [25, 156]. Information security researchers and practitioners
consequently formulate educational and awareness drives to deliver knowledge of good practice.
The aim is to improve security routines across the organization, thereby improving resilience
and reducing risk [4, 76]. Governments also provide a great deal of advice to citizens in terms
of how to practice good security hygiene [43, 73, 82, 120, 146].
Yet all these efforts do not seem to have been particularly successful in terms of reducing
insecure behaviors [11, 36, 140]. Even those who do possess knowledge of “good practice” do
not seem to be willing to change their usual routines [39, 94, 22]. It has become clear that
an approach that relies solely on information provision is unlikely to be sufficient in terms of
changing behavior [66, 69, 70, 88, 114]. It is interesting to note that the empirical findings by
Warkentin et al. [176] showed that users prefer their own passwords over ones generated for
them, even though the latter may be stronger.
As the field has come to realize that knowledge, on its own, is not the silver bullet in
achieving behavior change, there have been attempts to manipulate the choice architecture to
nudge people towards stronger passwords [51, 144]. While these manipulations show promise,
they do not help us to understand the underlying reasons for reluctance to embrace stronger
password choice routines.
Similar levels of change resistance manifest in other domains, too [30, 90, 81, 167]; security
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behaviors are not unique in this respect. In this paper, we briefly review two prominent theories
before introducing the explanation we investigated in our research: the endowment effect. We
do not claim that other factors do not exert an influence; only that one influential factor might
be the endowment effect, and that efforts to understand and minimize its impact might well
reduce resistance.
Reasons for Change Resistance in Security
The literature suggests a wide range of explanations for unwillingness to switch when people do
indeed have the knowledge to behave securely. These include: intransigence, a lack of under-
standing of the importance of the activity, ignorance of the severity of potential consequences,
or just plain laziness [3, 52, 64, 83, 111, 113, 188]. Infusing the situation with moral undertones
can achieve the opposite of what is intended [41], and is unlikely to help the situation.
A variety of explanations for change resistance have been suggested by the research litera-
ture. Laumer and Eckhardt [100] review a range of IS-related resistance theories, ranging from
perceived threats [99] to power considerations [106] to status quo bias [93] and learned help-
lessness [109]. Many of the theories they discuss have been revealed when studying resistance
within organizations, but some theories could well apply to personal security routines too.
Another possible explanation for change resistance is the fact that humans seek to copy
their own past behaviors. Ariely and Norton refer to this phenomenon as self-herding [8]. This
pattern might occur because people have a need for consistency [37], or because changing would
require them to admit that the way they have been doing things up to that point was wrong, and
this would somehow create a sense of cognitive dissonance [56]. If they were to agree to change
the way they do things, this would constitute an admission that their previous routines were
sub-optimal and might have led to negative outcomes. Sherman and Cohen [150] explain that
people prefer to consider themselves responsible for producing positive, rather than negative,
outcomes. They cite [71, 158, 115] to substantiate this argument. This would mean that if
someone were asked to change a personal security routine and told that they had to do this
because their existing routine was leading to negative outcomes (insecurity), they might well
decline to countenance a change. Changing would constitute an admission of the inadequacy of
their existing routines and implied responsibility for potentially negative outcomes, and people
might understandably want to avoid this.
It is possible that a number of these factors come into play in this situation, and lead to
rejection of switching suggestions, despite any persuasive attempts to describe the merits of the
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alternative routine. People might even avoid listening to information that would lead to the
uncomfortable feelings of dissonance. Sweeny [157] explains that people do avoid information
if such information would require them to change their beliefs, take undesired actions, or be
likely to elicit unpleasant emotions. All of these seem to apply to someone suggesting that a
well-embedded password creation routine should be replaced.
The situation is probably multi-factorial, and complex, as is most human behavior [130]. It
is likely that a range of influences come into play when people reject security advice, and that
the reasons differ from person to person and from day to day, depending on a wide range of
causatives, ranging from individual to contextual to organizational pressures and characteristics
[20]. That being so, we cannot expect any one explanation, and intervention, to “solve” this
and remove all resistance. Yet we do not have the luxury of abandoning efforts merely because
the situation is so complex. We have to keep trying to pick apart all the factors leading to this
resistance and reluctance. Employees can be our strongest defence against hacker attempts,
but only if they behave securely. We have to find out how best to encourage and engender this
kind of behavior.
In advancing explanations from non-security domains below, we make the assumption that
people do indeed know what they ought to be doing (the advised routine) and how to implement
it (knowledge & skills). We are not attempting to address a knowledge deficit issue in this
discussion.
3 Theory Types
Markus and Robey [107] introduce two types of theories that are used when the consequences
of organizational change are studied (variance and process). Burton-Jones et al. [31] mention
both of these and add another: systems. The latter is not as applicable in our context but
due consideration of process and variance theories provide a useful perspective to structure our
discussion. Variance theory attempts to identify and isolate the impact of predictor variables,
and their strengths, on a particular outcome. Such causal identification is generally static and
snapshot based. Process theory explains how outcomes develop longitudinally i.e. in discrete
and sequential stages.
Variance theories focus on factors that are necessary and sufficient conditions for contribut-
ing towards a particular outcome, such as change resistance. Process theories focus on condi-
tions under which outcomes can occur, but are not guaranteed to. They focus on particular
states or stages, and changes of such, in leading to outcomes. Table 1 provides an overview of
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the key differences between these two perspectives in terms of studying resistance to change.
Figure 1 contrasts the two theories.
Variance Theory (Imperative) Vi Process Theory (Emergent) Pi
R
el
at
io
n
sh
ip
V1: Cause → Effect
— Outcome ∈ {Effect}
P1: Cause ≺ Effect;
— Outcome ∈ {Effect, Ø}
Cause is necessary and sufficient Cause is necessary
Effect will invariably occur:
— when cause is present
Effect may not occur
— even if cause is present
Cause explains Effect Cause precedes Effect
A
m
p
li
fi
ca
ti
on
V2: Cause++ → Effect++
Outcome ∈ {Effect++}
P2: Cause++ ≺ Effect;
Outcome ∈ {Effect, Ø}
More Cause leads to more effect Chance and random events play a role
C
er
ta
in
ty V3: Link between Cause & Effect
— is certain
P3: Cause makes Effect possible
T
ri
gg
er
V4: Cause leads to, and engenders,
effect
P4: Effects influenced by
social phenomena
F
o
cu
s
V5: Influential variables taking
a range of values
P5: Discontinuous and emergent
phenomena
P
re
d
ic
ta
b
il
it
y
V6: Outcomes are predictable,
based on magnitude of causative
variables
P6: Outcomes are predictable from
knowledge of process
Legend: causes (→); precedes (≺); more of (++); one of (∈); no effect(Ø)
Table 1: Contrasting Variance and Process Theories (extending Figure 3 from [107])
We cannot hope to review the behavioral change resistance field comprehensively in the
related work section of a single paper, so we will provide one variance theory (habit) and one
process theory (change readiness). We then introduce the endowment effect, a psychological
explanation for change resistance. We will also consider whether it is a variance or process
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Figure 1: Top: Variance Theory (Imperative); Bottom: Process Theory (Emergent).
theory. In these discussions we will refer to instantiations of the relationships between cause
and effect by number Vi (Variance) and Pi (Process), as indicated in Table 1.
To investigate the phenomenon of perceived ownership and the endowment effect, as it
relates to computer users choosing, then owning, their password creation routine, we must
necessarily look at both variance and process theories. Variance models provide insights into
the associations that individuals perceive between various perceptions and beliefs, such as
perceptions of threats and responses. Process models inform our thinking about how such
perceptions and beliefs are formed over the course of time.
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3.1 Habit (Variance Theory)
Binder and Boldero [20] argue that consideration of habit must be included whenever human
behavior is being contemplated. James [84] argued that habits (pre-existing routines) were
essential in understanding how humans behave. Aarts et al. [1] explain that habits develop
to satisfy goals and, over time, become automatic when cued in particular situations (V1).
Indeed, Bargh et al. [13] found that habits could be cued without people even being aware
that a particular habit had been activated (V3). Indeed, Wood and Neal [182] argue that habit
associations are constructed slowly as the person engages in the habitual behavior. They are
not easily changed, even if current goals are altered.
Duhigg [49] explains that habitual routines are cued by context, and that they lead to
a reward. As Aarts suggests, habitual behaviors become ingrained over time as the same cue
repeatedly triggers the same routine (V4, V6-considering habit duration as a causative). Pinder
et al. [131] review behavioral change publications in human-computer interaction research and
find that the influence of habit is often neglected. They cite [122] to make the point that
“habitual behaviors are the default behavior when people are unable or unwilling to make
effortful decisions about how to behave” [p.3]. (Emphasis ours)
If we consider that many schools require pupils to start using passwords at a very young
age, the pre-existence of password creation habits is likely in adults [104, 171], which would
also contribute to their entrenchment and habitual nature (V4, V6).
Habits exhibit the characteristics of a variance theory if we consider the cause to be the
cue (“create a password”), and the reward to be “ease of password creation”, for example.
Significant associations between measures of these constructs imply that the cue is sufficient
to trigger activation of the habitual routine (V1). Covariance associations suggest the certain
link between cause and effect, once the habit is well established, which is typical of a variance
theory (V3, V6).
What many educational efforts do not acknowledge, nor factor into their delivery, is the
influence exerted by such habitual pre-existing routines. When people are confronted with a
new routine, and asked to switch, those familiar routines (habits) make up a powerful incentive
to eschew change. Change being effortful [65], and humans being maximally efficient [52, 190],
means that they are not actually making a choice between equivalent options. They are being
asked to switch to a much more inefficient option, at least in the short term. Consumer behavior
research terms this phenomenon “switching cost.”
Humans are present-focused and more likely to be influenced by present effort than future
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benefit [27], making a switch unlikely. This has been termed psychological distance in the tem-
poral dimension by the construal-level theory (CLT). It rests on the core tenet that people have
direct experience only of the here and now and create mental simulations abstracted from this
experience, namely “construals”, to represent objects and events that are not directly accessi-
ble through senses [61, 54, 162]. Psychological distance has four dimensions: (1) temporal, (2)
spatial, (3) social, and (4) hypothetical [12, 162]. The abstractness of these construals depends
on their psychological distance from the self, namely the subjective perception that something
“takes place further into the future, [. . . ] occurs in a more remote location, [. . . ] happens to
people less and less like oneself, and [. . . ] is less likely to occur” [163, p. 84]. Temporal distance
refers to the perception that an event occurs at a time near (proximal) vs. far (distal) from the
individual (e.g., the near vs. distant past or future). The greater the temporal distance, the
higher the construal level used mentally to represent the object or event.
Duhigg [49] advises people to understand their habit loop if they want to break a habit.
In particular, they should figure out what the cue is, and what reward the person gains from
engaging in the habit, which confirms the influential factors mentioned by V5. For password
creation as habit, the cue is clear: a screen asking them to formulate a new password to open
an account for some service they want to use. The obvious reward is that they can satisfy
their goals as quickly and easily as possible. The less obvious reward is that the password
creation habit, if it exists, creates passwords with a measure of automaticity that is attractive
to human cognitive misers [175], confirming V4. Habitual password creation routines are thus
understandably resistant to change.
3.2 Change Readiness (Process Theory)
Norcross et al. [123] explain that individuals inhabit particular stages of change: (1) pre-
contemplation, (2) contemplation, (3) preparation, (4) action and (5) maintenance. The per-
son’s current stage will determine how he or she reacts to a suggestion that a change be made in
their existing routine. This kind of staged change readiness is also proposed by [29, 85, 102, 134].
If someone approaches a pre-contemplative person, assuming that he or she is in the con-
templation or preparation stages, they are likely to drive individuals in the opposite direction
and advice will be rejected [19, 58].
Norcross et al. [123] urge anyone wanting individuals to change behavior first to assess the
person’s readiness for change, because the most effective persuasive techniques to be used are
different for people, depending on their current readiness stage. Yet it is understandable that
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security awareness training is not delivered in this way due to the urgency of the issue and
the fears around hackers compromising organizational systems. It might seem as if such an
approach would be indulgent where such tolerance is simply too risky.
Many people do not understand why people with full knowledge of good practice will not
unhesitatingly and willingly adopt it [110]. Their assumption is that “knowledge” as cause,
leads to strong passwords, as effect. Yet the reality demonstrates that this particular cause
(knowledge) is not sufficient to lead to the desired effect [11, 105] because the situation is
far more complex than a mere lack of knowledge [22]. The same goes for assuming that the
existence of a security policy will automatically lead to the desired effect: secure behaviors
[181]. Both of these are necessary, but not sufficient, factors.
This confirms P1 and P3. Many organizations will retrain employees when they realise
that initial training did not deliver the desired results, and find that more knowledge still
does not invariably lead to stronger passwords across the board, demonstrating P2. Tsohou
et al. [165], for example, find that cognitive and cultural biases shape risk perceptions and
security behaviors, confirming the importance of understanding all the factors contributing to
the process (P4, P5 and P6).
Change readiness exhibits the characteristics of process theory because people inhabit par-
ticular stages, and no amount of training, while necessary and essential, will make any difference
to actual behaviors if the person is in a pre-contemplative stage. The transition from one stage
to another can happen based on random events or interactions; stages and transitions are part
and parcel of the essential process. For example, someone could be completely closed to any
idea of change (Pre-Contemplative), but then have a random conversation with a close family
member and subsequently be willing to contemplate listening to persuasive arguments (Con-
templative) confirming P6. This would explain why, when educational drives often fail to make
a difference, and the organization decides that more drives are necessary, these also fail to
achieve their aim. More of a particular variable makes no difference when the situation is best
described by a process theory (P2).
3.3 The Endowment Effect
There is a great deal of evidence to show that people place a higher value on artifacts they own
than on those they do not own [2, 34, 59, 86, 101]. This phenomenon, termed “the endowment
effect” is evidenced first by a reluctance to exchange owned artifacts for replacements [117].
The second consequence is evidenced by the difference between the amount of money people are
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willing to accept (WTA) and how much they are willing to pay (WTP) for the owned (endowed)
artifact, with the former exceeding the latter [2, 117].
This effect is not only triggered by endowed physical artifacts, but also by endowed time and
routines [75, 118, 137], which makes it of interest in the password creation context. There is
also evidence of the endowment effect being triggered by people self associating themselves with
a brand [133]. Even when people were simply asked to associate themselves with a geometric
shape did they subsequently associate different rewards with those shapes. It seems worth
determining whether people associate their password routines with themselves, given the fact
that this self association has proved so powerful in other contexts. If this is the case, it could
well trigger an endowment effect as a consequence (P4, P6).
The endowment effect exhibits characteristics of process theory. We know it is triggered
when someone feels that they own an artifact (required condition), but it does not infallibly do
so (necessary, but not sufficient, to lead to the desired outcome) (P1). Arlen and Tontrup [10]
suggest that the endowment effect only triggers when the person owning the endowed artifact
has full responsibility for trading it for another. This seems to be another necessary, but not
sufficient, condition. This demonstrates the importance of multiple factors preceding a desired
outcome effect (P3). In the password field, ensuring that people know how to create strong
passwords is also necessary, but not sufficient [66, 69, 70, 88, 114]. Knowledge thus constitutes
a third necessary condition that needs to exist, yet there is no evidence that more knowledge
invariably leads to more secure behaviors (P2; ¬V1).
Two of the pre-existing causes (ownership & responsibility) are either valid or not; there
is no way of varying or amplifying these conditions. This kind of condition aligns with the
tenets of process theory. In the case of the third condition (knowledge), it is clear that having
more knowledge does not automatically map to improved password creation routines [74]. This
breaks V3 of the variance theory, as enumerated in Table 1. Strahilevitz and Loewenstein [155]
explain that the endowment effect increases with the length of time that the endowed artifact
has been owned, which also suggests a longitudinal process rather than a single cause with a
consequent deterministic effect, confirming P5.
Sometimes people do not feel endowed with an artifact, and so do not over-value it: the
endowment effect is not triggered (P1). The variance theory would suggest that ownership
will always lead to a feeling of endowment: that the outcome should be both predictable and
certain (¬V6). If the endowment effect were explained by variance theory, ownership would
be sufficient to trigger the endowment effect (¬V1). This does not occur, which suggests that
variance theory does not apply when one considers the endowment effect outcome (¬V1).
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Explanations for the endowment effect include:
• a feeling of ownership [112, 118]. Such a feeling could lead to a consequent sense of loss
aversion [90] at the idea of losing the artifact, or an aversion to the regret that would be
felt if a switch were made [155]. Some have suggested that the sunk cost effect comes into
play, preventing people from making a change [9, 187].
• individuals feeling a psychological attachment to what they own [145, 152] especially if
they have owned the artifact for any significant period of time [95, 155]. Chatterjee et al.
[35] suggest that attachment and ownership interact to evidence as the endowment effect.
• the idea that ownership somehow bolsters self image [6, 35, 132], or that people associate
the owned artifact with themselves [18, 108]. They might well use it to signal competence
[116].
The observable effect of such over-valuing is that the owner will react to a switching
suggestion by focusing on the positive aspects of the owned artifact [23, 50, 81, 121, 125],
while, at the same time, highlighting the potential negative outcomes of switching [189].
In general, this manifests as change resistance [93] and an apparent discounting of advice
[21, 147, 186, 185] when a suggestion of a switch or a swap is made. Consider how this
would apply to password creation. Jan comes up with an algorithm to create passwords,
and having done so, and liking the positive aspects of using this mechanism, decides to
adopt it: a self-endowment as it were. Brehm [26] explains that, having made a choice,
Jan is likely to emphasize the positive aspects of the chosen routine, and the negative
aspects of the discarded routines. When someone comes along and tries to convince Jan
to adopt another password creation mechanism Jan still focuses on the most negative
aspect of the new mechanism [23], which might well include the cost, in terms of time
and effort, of adopting the new routine.
Consequences of the endowment effect (endowment calculus outcomes) include:
1. the utility of the artifact being over-estimated, particularly by subjective perceptions of
risk [91].
Prior experimental research has investigated the interplay between risk, loss aversion, and
endowment effects, but much of that research treats risk and endowment as orthogonal
independent variables (e.g., [97, 149]). Moreover, much of that risk-related economic
and psychological research employs experimental designs in which subjects participate in
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lotteries with known objective probabilities (e.g., outcomes are dependent on dice rolls
[7]).
Past endowment research strongly suggests that feelings of endowment are produced
“apparently instantaneously” [166, p.1041],[89, 128] while risk judgments are “constructed
. . . through a combination of affective and analytic evaluations of risky options” [57,
p.142]. As the product of an extended cognitive process, perceived risk is thus more
akin to change willingness than it is to endowment. Accordingly, perceived risk will be
conceptualized in our study as an outcome of an endowment calculus.
2. reluctance to adopt new routines (i.e. change unwillingness, which is the main outcome
of the endowment effect), as revealed in other studies where people decline to make a
change because they have already made a choice and want to stick with it [26, 117, 148].
Kahneman et al. [90] refer to the endowment effect as the status quo bias.
3. the owned artifact will be over-valued. For physical artifacts, this is evidenced by the
difference between WTA and WTP. For time, it is evidenced by people wanting more
payment for their own time spent than they think others should be paid for the same
labor taking the same amount of time [75].
3.4 Risk
People tend to engage in behaviors based on their perceptions of the risks related to the be-
havior [142, 183]. Risk perceptions thus play a vital role in predicting whether or not people
will engage in precautionary behaviors [24]. A password is intended to prevent people from
accessing a resource or service using someone else’s identifier. As such, it is essentially a risk
management mechanism. Van Schaik et al. [170] identified a number of predictors of pre-
cautionary cyber security behaviors. Other researchers have carried out similar studies, also
identifying particular predictors [67, 79, 164, 103]. These studies confirm a link between risk
perception and precautionary behaviors.
Yet other studies have failed to find evidence for this relationship [40, 72, 33]. Hence
we considered it appropriate to include a tool to measure risk perception in our model, and
to determine the interdependencies between risk perception and the other constructs we are
measuring.
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3.5 In Summary
We have reviewed three potential explanations for a reluctance to adopt new security routines.
Each is likely to play a role, as do others. All deserve research attention and full investigation.
We chose to focus on the endowment effect and the role it potentially plays in triggering change
resistance related to password creation routines.
To determine whether the endowment effect is indeed triggered by the password creation
request acting as a cue, we will gather evidence by extrapolating from measures used to test
endowment of physical artifacts that people own, as well as measures to assess risk perception.
4 Investigating the Endowment Effect
We sought evidence for the triggering of the endowment effect in the following phenomena:
1. H1: people have pre-existing routines for creating passwords.
2. H2: people are “endowed” with their routines i.e.
(a) they feel a sense of ownership with respect to their pre-existing routines.
(b) they feel attached to their routines.
(c) they over-value their routines.
(d) their routines are connected to their personal self image.
3. H3: people will exhibit endowment calculus outcomes based on the extent to which they
are “endowed” with their routines i.e.
(a) they will exhibit decreased perceived risk.
(b) they will be less willing to switch routines.
To find evidential support for these hypotheses, we designed several survey instruments,
whose questions are shown in the Appendix. Figure 2 details all the tested hypotheses.
We conducted three surveys:
1. Survey 1 — Determine that Pre-Existing Routines Exist & Explore Routine
Types: Qualtrics Survey with 106 student respondents. We embedded attention ques-
tions to weed out unthinking responses. This left 98 responses for analysis (32% Male,
68% Female).
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Figure 2: Model 1 (Hypotheses to be Tested).
2. Survey 2 — Confirm Routine Existence & Explore Reasons for Resistance:
Mechanical Turk survey. We received 313 responses. After removing those that failed
attention questions or suggested nonsense responses, we were left with 300 responses (63%
Male, 37% Female).
3. Survey 3 — Test for Endowment Calculus Outcomes: Mechanical Turk survey.
We received 332 responses. After removing records where people had failed attention
questions, we were left with 301 responses to support analysis (60% Male, 40% Female).
Measurement Constructs
The questions posed to assess the core constructs are provided in the Appendix. For all ques-
tions, the order of options was randomized. Attention questions were embedded to weed out
unheeding responses. We also filtered out responses that were extreme outliers when the survey
was completed within seconds rather than the 5-10 minutes it ought to have taken.
Ownership: Questions (O1, O2, O3) were adapted from those proposed by Van Dyne and
Pierce [168].
Attachment: Thomson et al. [159] explain that a sense of attachment manifests in ex-
pressions of an emotional reactions towards the artifact. For example, attachment leads people
to want to preserve their relationship with the artifact and to feel favorable and loyal towards
it. They are also likely to be satisfied with the artifact, and express a sense of involvement
with it. We thus tested this construct with questions: A1 (favorability), A2 (continuance of
relationship), A3 (loyalty) and A4 (satisfaction).
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Perceived risk: The questions (P1, P2, P3) were adapted from those used by Johnston
and Warkentin [87].
Change willingness: There are measurement constructs for “openness to change” [80],
but they will not measure willingness to change password routines, in particular. Hence we
asked about willingness to change (C1 — openness), plans to change (C2 — definite future)
and predictions of change (C3 — probable future).
4.1 H1: Pre-Existing Routines
We first posed a question to determine whether people had their own pre-existing routines for
password creation:
Survey 1 Question: Do you have a usual practice for CREATING your passwords? 66%
said yes, 25% said no, and 8% were unsure.
We then elicited more information about their routines. First, we asked them how similar
their password creation routines were to a number of strategies, rating them as (1) Nothing like
mine, (2) Minor Similarities, (3) Some Similarities, (4) Similar and (5) Identical. The numbers
of participants who chose these are shown in Figure 3. Interestingly, of the 25 people who
claimed not to have a routine in Survey 1, 12 picked one of the strategies mentioned in Figure
3, which suggests that they actually did have a routine.
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Figure 3: Password Creation Routine Types.
If they indicated similarity to “what you know”, we followed up by asking them whether
their strategy was similar to a number of options, as shown in Figure 4. If they indicated an
algorithm, we followed up by offering them the options shown in Figure 5. (People could choose
multiple strategies).
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Figure 5: Algorithmic Password Creation Routines.
Survey 2 Question: (Confirming Survey 1’s finding) Do you have a usual practice for
CREATING your passwords? 84% said yes, 14% said no, and 2% were unsure. This confirmed
that a majority of our respondents did indeed claim to have their own usual routine for creating
passwords.
Evidence from our two surveys, augmented by multitudinous online comments, suggests
that H1 can be accepted.
4.2 H2: Endowment Effect
Ownership & Attachment
The questions posed in Survey 3 to assess ownership and attachment are shown in the Appendix.
Figure 6 depicts responses to the “ownership” questions, and Figure 7 depicts responses to the
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“attachment” questions. In both cases responses suggest that not only do most respondents
possess routines (confirming H1), but that they feel a sense of ownership of, and attachment
to, such routines.
Figure 6: Agreement with Ownership Questions.
Figure 7: Agreement with Attachment Questions.
Over-Valuing
We tested this aspect in Survey 3 by approximating the usual (WTA-WTP) payment scenarios
used to test the endowment effect for physical artifacts. It would have been ideal if we could
have used one of the pre-existing WTA:WTP comparisons that other endowment studies use,
but the snag is that one does not relinquish a routine as one relinquishes a physical object if
one decides to trade it, so there was no direct mapping for us to use.
Hence we set up a scenario where we “paid” people for the effort it would take to switch. we
were testing whether respondents considered their time and effort more valuable than that of
other people. In this case, therefore, the effort that went into developing the existing password
creation routine is the endowment.
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As stated earlier, the difference between routine endowment and physical object endowment
is that, with a physical artifact, the person sets the WTA price based on the assumption that
if he/she sells the artifact, he/she will no longer own it or have access to it. Of course with
routines this is unrealistic: changing a routine does not mean relinquishing access to the previous
routine.
We had to come up with an approximation, as follows. We would determine how much
money people would be willing to accept to change their routine. In this case, they are not
paid to give up their routine for good; they are being paid for being willing to learn a new
routine, and to adopt it in the future. This is not a perfect compromise, but, comparing what
other people should be willing to accept to do this, and what the person him/herself should be
willing to be paid, we can detect a difference.
We used this approximation hoping that it would give us some indication of whether the
person was endowed with their pre-existing routine.
We first set the scene by asking them to imagine that a bank had decided to pay people
to choose stronger passwords. We then asked them to fix on an amount they were willing to
accept and an amount the bank would have to pay other people to be willing to do this. The
full question is provided in the Appendix. Table 2 details the descriptive statistics of their
responses to the two questions.
Tests for normality (Shapiro-Wilk) showed that neither set of values was normally dis-
tributed (p<0.001). We used a Wilcoxon signed rank test to carry out pair-wise comparisons.
This showed that WTA was significantly greater than WTP for changing their password cre-
ation routine (p=0.007). Thus, using the same mechanism as that used to test endowment for
physical artifacts, we showed an endowment effect was likely to be triggered for pre-existing
password creation routines.
N Min Max Mean StdDev
Pay Others 290 0 500 23.05 43.52
Pay Me 290 0 1500 28.78 104.013
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for ‘Pay Others’ vs. ‘Pay Me.’
Self-Image
Here, we used a scenario-based question. Alexander and Becker [5] argue that scenario questions
are useful when researchers are attempting to approximate real-life decision-making situations,
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especially when the decision being measured might have social desirability undertones [78].
Trevino [160] makes the point that it is sometimes better to use a scenario than a direct
question in these cases. The scenario method allows us to pose questions indirectly, to trigger
realistic responses. Scenario questions have been used in other information security studies
[14, 15, 44, 55, 87, 98, 161, 180].
We created a scenario with two people arguing about how they create their passwords1, as
follows: “Terry and Pat are talking about how they create their passwords. Terry’s and Pat’s
ways of coming up with new passwords are very different. Terry says to Pat: ‘Your way is just
plain wrong!’” We then offered respondents eight options, and they could select as many as
they liked (randomly ordered except for the final one):
a) Pat retorts “My way is better than yours.”
b) Pat says “My way is good enough.”
c) Pat feels hurt.
d) Pat changes the subject.
e) Pat ends the conversation and walks away.
f ) Pat says “Explain why it is wrong.”
g) Pat says “Tell me more so I can adopt your way.”
h) None of the above, please explain.
The first five options suggest self protection responses [150] in line with Pat becoming defensive
(a,b), avoiding (c,d) or withdrawing (e). These are all signs of ‘Pat’ feeling that his/her self
image is connected in some way with a particular behavior. We were hoping to elicit the
respondent’s personal feelings that their own self is threatened by the exchange with ‘Terry’,
and responding in a way that would reduce the threat. The sixth response suggests a willingness
to listen to why their routine is wrong, and the seventh reflects a willingness to adopt a different
routine. The final option allows them to nominate their own response.
Five people chose the “None of the Above” option but did not provide an explanation.
Figure 8 shows the number of people who selected at least one self-defense option, those who
selected option (f) (Listening) or option (g) (Adopting).
1These names have been chosen specifically to ensure gender equality
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Figure 8: Responses to having Password Creation Routine Challenged.
The most common response is a self-defense option: avoiding, feeling hurt, feeling defensive
or withdrawing. The second most chosen combination is self-defense followed by a request
for Terry to explain the assertion. 15% chose the adoption response. What is particularly
interesting is that a very small number (4) checked both self-defense and adoption options.
This suggests that if an attack on a person’s routine invokes a self-defense response, subsequent
adoption is unlikely as a next step.
4.3 H3: Change Resistance
Surveys 1 & 2
We posed a question in both Surveys 1 and 2 to get a feel for the level of change resistance (“I
don’t want to change the way I create passwords?”). The average of all responses in Survey
1 was 5.2 (between “Somewhat Agree” and “Agree”). The median and mode were both 6
(Agree). The average over all responses in Survey 2 was 4.98, with a mode of 6 (Agree) and
a median of 5 (Somewhat Agree). This suggests a general but not strong unwillingness to
consider changing their password creation routine. The percentages of different responses are
shown in Figure 9. The profile is somewhat different for the two cohorts, perhaps due to their
different make-up: Survey 1 respondents were students, Survey 2 respondents were Mechanical
Turk workers.
We asked people why they would be unwilling to switch routines (proffered options presented
in random order). Their responses are depicted in Figure 10. It is interesting that the most
popular option was one that referred to the person’s pre-existing routine. The second most
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Figure 9: Please indicate your agreement with the following statement: I don’t want to change
the way I CREATE passwords (Shown as Percentages).
popular option suggests that people are content with their own routine. Two people chose
the “Other” option, offering the following comments: ‘Every outfit seems to have different
requirements and keeping track of them all is a hassle’, and ‘More difficult to retain’
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Figure 10: Reasons for Unwillingness to Change.
Survey 3: Perceived Risk and Unwillingness to Change as Endowment Effect Out-
comes
We examined the effects of Attachment and Ownership on Perceived Risk and Change Will-
ingness the better to understand the role of endowment effects on those outcomes. The effects
of Self-image and Over Value were not examined because their measurement items were not
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normally distributed and thus not amenable to maximum likelihood estimation in structural
equation models [32].
Given the newness of our Attachment and Ownership constructs, an exploratory factor
analysis (EFA) with Varimax rotation comparing those factors against Perceived Risk and
Change Willingness was performed using IBM SPSS v. 24.0.0.0. Results from the EFA and
reliability tests assessing Coefficient α both support the convergent and discriminant validity
of those four variables (Table 3).
Coeff
αa
CRb AVEc Attachmentd Ownership Perc’d
Risk
Change
Willing-
ness
Attachment 0.84 0.83 0.46 0.68
Ownership 0.88 0.89 0.72 0.51 0.85
Perc’d Risk 0.72 0.71 0.45 -0.37 -0.03 0.67
Change
Willingness
0.80 0.81 0.59 -0.09 0.13 0.56 0.77
a Coefficient alpha
b Composite Reliability
c Average Variance Extracted
d Diagonal elements in Columns 5-8 are the square root of the AVE. Non-diagonal elements are
factor correlations
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Survey 3’s Measurement Model.
Additional convergent and discriminant validity tests were conducted using a measurement
model for the Attachment, Ownership, Perceived Risk, and Change Willingness variables. This
model was tested using IBM SPSS Amos v. 24.0.0. Modification indices indicated high corre-
lations between three sets of error terms for the Attachment construct. These were allowed to
correlate in subsequent measurement and structural models.
Results from the second measurement model analysis were used to assess Composite Re-
liability (CR), Average Variance Extracted (AVE), and factor correlations. These statistics
were calculated using Gaskin’s Excel-based Stats Tools Package [68]. In the initial analysis,
the AVEs for Attachment and Perceived Risk were slightly below the desired threshold of 0.50.
However, the CRs for those two variables were above 0.70, indicating that convergent validity
was adequate for our exploratory study. The correlations between the four latent variables were
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all below the square root of the corresponding AVEs, thus supporting discriminant validity.
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Figure 11: Model 2 (Post-Hoc Structural Model).
χ2 df p GFI CFI TLI RMSEA
Model 1 (Original Structural Model)
240.58 81 0.000 0.90 0.92 0.89 0.08
Model 2 (Post-Hoc Structural Model)a
188.94 80 0.000 0.92 0.94 0.93 0.07
a χ2 Model 1 - χ2 Model 2 = 240.5881 – 188.9480 = 51.641, p < 0.001
GFI: Goodness Fit Index
CFI: Comparative Fit Index
TLI: Tucker Lewis index
RMSEA: Root Mean Square Error of Approximation
Table 4: Goodness of Fit Statistics for Survey 3’s Structural Model.
Hypothesis 3 was tested using a structural model based on Figure 1 and Table 2. Modifica-
tion indices indicated the original structural model (Model 1 — Figure 2) could be significantly
improved by adding a path between “Perceived Risk” and “Change Willingness” (Model 2 —
Figure 11). Though not part of the original H3, the addition of this path is supported by
research indicating that endowment effects are associated with perceived risks (e.g., [173]) and
that risk can be a predictor of change readiness (e.g., [136]). Given the exploratory nature of
our study, we deemed it appropriate to test this improved Model 2. Goodness of fit values for
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Models 1 and 2 are displayed in Table 4. Goodness of Fit statistics for the improved model
suggests it exhibits adequate fit for our exploratory research. The difference in χ2 between
the original and post-hoc structural models indicates significant improvement of Model 2 over
Model 1 (p < 0.001).
Standardized regression and explained variance statistics (i.e., B and R2, respectively) from
Models 1 and 2 are compared in Table 5. Perhaps the most striking finding is that the B
values for “Attachment→ Change Willingness” and “Ownership→ Change Willingness” both
change from significant at the p < 0.001 level in Model 1 to non-significant in the post-hoc
Model 2. The B values for the Attachment → Perceived Risk and Ownership → Perceived
Risk remain largely unchanged. Taken together, these findings indicate that erceived Risk
fully mediates the relationships between Attachment→ Change Willingness and Ownership→
Change Willingness. Coupled with these mediation effects is the observation that the R2 of
Change Willingness in Model 2 is not only meaningful, but that it is more than three times
larger than that of Model 1.
Dependent Variable
Perceived Risk Change Willingness
Predictor
Variablea
Original
Model
Post-Hoc
Model
Original
Model
Post-Hoc
Model
Attachment -.054 -0.52 -0.31 0.09
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.589)
Ownership 0.28 0.25 0.30 0.09
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.273)
Perceived
Risk
N/A N/A N/A 0.58
(<0.001)
Variance Explained Statistics
R2 0.21 0.20 0.09 0.32
a Standardized regression weights. p-values are displayed in parentheses.
Table 5: Path Statistics for Survey 3 Structural Model.
As expected, Attachment is negatively associated with Perceived Risk in Model 2 (i.e.,
Attachment is associated with a more positive valuation of their existing password creation
routine). Ownership, on the other hand, is positively associated with Perceived Risk. This
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surprising contradiction confirms the complexity of the endowment effect, a finding that is
reported in other research [57, 90].
5 Discussion, Reflection & Future Work
Pre-Existing Routines: Our research question explored whether individual computer users
had their own pre-existing routines for creating their authentication passwords, and the re-
sponses certainly showed that the majority of our respondents did feel that they had such
routines (Section 4.1). Though not a universal finding, two of our surveys confirmed this
assertion.
Evidence for endowment effect: Having confirmed the existence of routines that people
considered to be their usual practice, we then set out to find evidence of their own endowment
effect, in terms of endowment calculus outcomes. Responses to ownership and attachment
questions demonstrated agreement with these sentiments. We also showed that they tended to
over-value their existing routines. This was confirmed by their stated unwillingness to change
routines, reported in Section 4.3. We also showed that their WTA was significantly greater
than WTP, when it came to the effort involved in changing password creation routines (Section
4.2).
Confirmation of Artifact-Based Causatives: In Figure 10, we see some of the same
explanations for routine endowment as we saw in the literature related to endowed physical
artifacts. Most respondents valued their own password creation systems, and focused on the
negative aspects of switching to a new routine. They referred to their own system working well
enough (“why change? prefer to use my own”), and the negative consequences of changing
(“too much trouble”). They also mentioned the uncertainty related to switching (“don’t know
who to listen to”), one of the causes of the endowment effect mentioned in Section 3.3.
Our earlier exploration of the theoretical background for understanding the role of the en-
dowment effect in inhibiting the adoption of newer, and perhaps better, routines for creating
authentication passwords highlighted the complexity of this phenomenon, the psychological
nuances of the conscious and nonconscious decision processes that individuals pursue, and the
difficulties in isolating the relationships between the various contributing factors that have pre-
vented researchers from finding clarity and certainty in studies of endowment, including our
focal context of password creation routines. The human mind is indeed mysterious. Never-
theless, our findings have shed some light on this complex nomological conglomeration. The
insights that surfaced from our investigation reinforce that there are both variance (associa-
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tion) explanations and process (stage) explanations for why users want to retain their current
password creation routines. Our results show the covariance relationship between ownership
and attachment (variance), for example, and we also suggest a mediation role for perceived risk
in the thought process of individual users making this decision (process). Further, we noted
earlier that perceived risk was conceptualized as an outcome of an endowment calculus, and we
measured it by asking respondents to consider their password creation routines in contrast to
“other routines” in terms of robustness against hackers, with results that confirm our hypoth-
esis. This certainly implies that users assessed alternatives subsequent to the establishment of
their current routines when considering alternatives (a process), which may occur repeatedly
when confronted with novel information about password creation alternatives.
Reflection: In numerous other voluntary (not mandatory) technology adoption or change
decisions, individuals make the decision to switch. For example, evidence shows that millions
of users switched their primary web browser [28] (Internet Explorer was once dominant, and
now has a small market share). It is possible that password creation possesses certain salient
characteristics unlike other change decisions. For one thing, users’ perceived psychological
ownership may convey a sense of personal identity manifestation (self image) on a password
creation routine that individuals feel they have designed for themselves [108]. Internet Explorer,
on the other hand, was installed by default on Windows machines, and its initial widespread
use could be explained by the fact that most people stick with the default option [46].
Individuals may almost take some sense of personal pride in their personal development
of a password creation routine [124]. For another thing, switching costs may be very high,
especially as we all experience a proliferation of accounts and memberships requiring password
authentication. This, again, not being similar to the relatively painless switching of other kinds,
such as preferred browser.
The post-hoc finding that perceived risk fully mediates the relationships between endowment
effects and change willingness needs further exploration. Several research domains may be
instructive in this regard. For example, investigations examining the role of affect in endowment
effects (e.g., [57, 92]) may be especially fruitful. Research on the privacy calculus model (e.g.,
[42, 47]) may provide a rich context for future exploration of endowment effects, perceived risk,
and change willingness.
When we used a scenario to elicit responses to someone scotching a pre-existing routine
(testing the fact that the routine is linked to self image), we saw that people experienced it as
a threat, which was demonstrated by the majority choosing a self-protection response (Section
4.2). We also showed that such a response was unlikely to lead to adoption, based on the
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choices made by the respondents.
Theories: We commenced this paper by considering two types of theories that could explain
reluctance to adopt new security behaviors: variance and process (Section 3). We discussed how
the endowment theory had much in common with process theory since it required knowledge,
ownership and responsibility for trading to precede triggering of the effect. Given the outcome
of our investigation, we can confirm that, in the case of password creation routines, the situation
is best described by process theory. Many of our respondents demonstrated that they felt they
owned their personal routines, and felt attached to them. Moreover, there was evidence that
they over-valued the routines and self-identified with them (P1). The endowment effect was
thus triggered, demonstrating that these causes preceded the effect, but with no certainty
since a minority of our respondents did not feel endowed with their personal password creation
routines. This means that the effect was not certain, as one would expect it to be if it were
described by variance theory (¬V1, ¬V3, P3).
Future Work: The relationship between password creation routines and password storage
and recall routines warrants further scientific investigation. Creating a password is fundamen-
tally tied to the recall of that password, as users seek to create passwords they can remember.
If users were offered a new creation method that created passwords which were intrinsically
easier to remember, the decision calculus may conceivably tilt in favor of switching.
Another avenue for future work is the exploration of the role of the endowment effect as it
relates to other security behaviors. Do users have a sense of ownership over the method they
use to back up their data? What would it take to convince a user to start using an alternative
method to secure their data in these and other ways? We could also consider how they patch
their software, or how they determine if an email is legitimate or a phishing attempt.
This investigation offers some interesting insights which make the endowment effect worth
pursuing further, especially in this context. We intend to carry out further investigations into
the potential impact of the endowment effect, both in terms of password creation and also
other security routines. Finally we want to pursue mitigation measures that could be used to
minimize or neutralize its impact.
6 Limitations
We used a combination of existing and new scales and items to measure the endowment effect of
artifacts in our study. These scales may not be robust and highly refined when adapted to this
unique context. Further scale development and testing is could sample a more diverse audience
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(e.g., across organizational units and hierarchical levels) than our use of students and the
Mechanical Turk system. Additional techniques – particularly qualitative studies – could elicit
additional perspectives regarding endowment in ways that can increase scale generalizability
and deepen our understanding of endowment effects.
Similar recommendations apply to our assessments of perceived risk. Our tests of perceived
risk, as a predictor of change willingness, is predicated on modification indices from a post-hoc
analysis of our structural equation modeling results. Those associations were subsequently con-
firmed by findings in the literature. For example, associations between endowment/ownership
effects on risk perceptions are described in [16, 90], while associations between risk perceptions
and judgments/intentions are described in [90, 91]. Nonetheless, more theoretically rigorous
tests should be conducted in the context of information security to confirm these findings. As
with our above recommendations concerning endowment, additional scale development research
using more diverse samples across organizational units and hierarchies could support a deeper
understanding of risk perceptions in the context of information security and endowment effects.
Many organizations, websites, and apps that require passwords impose constraints and
mandatory processes for password creation and use that may supersede our findings. Biometric
authentication (and other emerging technologies) may make the use of passwords obsolete, or
at least less important in the future. Nonetheless, a number of information security threat
mitigation procedures may still be susceptible to endowment effects (e.g., ways to identify
and avoid email phishing attacks or malicious Web sites). The extent to which endowment
effects may compromise organizational efforts to resist such threats remains to be determined.
Moreover, the cat-and-mouse nature of information security suggests that new challenges will
arise over time, and that some of them may be susceptible to endowment effects.
7 Conclusion
This paper reports on an investigation into whether the endowment effect is a possible expla-
nation for change resistance when it comes to password creation. We did indeed find evidence
for pre-existing routines, change resistance, and an endowment effect calculus.
We thus conclude that initial evidence points towards the likelihood that people do indeed
feel endowed with their password creation routines. We suggest that further experiments be
carried out to confirm or deny our findings, and explore an endowment effect influence when it
comes to other security routines.
In concluding, we reiterate that the endowment effect is merely one of a host of factors that
30
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can contribute towards people’s reluctance to adopt more secure password creation routines.
Others, some of which are reviewed in Section 2, will undoubtedly also come into play. More
research will need to be carried out to confirm their influence in the cyber security arena, and
in understanding how they might interact with and reinforce or neutralize each other.
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Appendix: Endowment Calculus Causative Measures
Self-Image Test
Terry and Pat are talking about how they create their passwords. Terry’s and Pat’s ways of
coming up with new passwords are very different.
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Terry says to Pat: “Your way is just plain wrong!”
How do you think Pat reacts? Check as many as apply.
a) Pat retorts “My way is better than yours.”
b) Pat says “My way is good enough.”
c) Pat feels hurt.
d) Pat changes the subject.
e) Pat ends the conversation and walks away.
f ) Pat says “Explain why it is wrong.”
g) Pat says “Tell me more so I can adopt your way.”
h) None of the above, please explain.
Over-Valuing Test
Imagine you are opening a new online banking account. You’ve just come to the part of the
process where you’re asked to provide a password to protect your account.
Come up with a NEW password in your mind. Don’t reuse one of your other passwords.
Now think about the process you’ve just engaged in to come up with your new password
and bear it in mind in answering the next few screens of questions
Imagine the bank really wants to encourage their customers to create stronger passwords.
They are thinking of paying people hard cash to do this.
How much should the bank offer their customers (in US dollars) to create a stronger pass-
word for their account at this bank?
How much would the bank have to offer YOU personally (in US dollars) to create a stronger
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password?
Measuring Endowment Causatives and Calculus Elements
(Capitalization exactly as used in Survey)
Ownership O1: I feel a high degree of OWNERSHIP of my password creation strategy.
O2: I feel like I OWN my password creation strategy.
O3: I feel like the way I create passwords is “MY” password creation strat-
egy.
Attachment A1: My passwords protect my online accounts.
A2: My passwords EFFECTIVELY protect my accounts.
A3: I believe my password creation strategy is GOOD ENOUGH for me.
A4: The passwords I use to protect IMPORTANT accounts are STRONG
ENOUGH to resist attempts to breach them.
Perceived
Risk
P1: My passwords are MORE LIKELY to protect me than passwords cre-
ated using other routines.
P2: The passwords I create are BETTER THAN alternatives created using
other routines.
P3: My password creation routine makes it HARDER FOR HACKERS to
guess my passwords than other creation routines.
Change C1: I am willing to consider CHANGING the way I create passwords.
Willingness C2: I plan to CHANGE the way I create my passwords.
C3: I predict that I will CHANGE the way I create my passwords.
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